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Prevention Cascade:  The United States and the Diffusion of R2P 
Michael Galchinsky 
Georgia State University 
 
Introduction 
 In 2004, Sudan won a third term on the Human Rights Commission at the very moment 
its government was carrying out a genocide in Darfur.  The juxtaposition exposed the abysmal 
job the global governance system has done of living up to its responsibilities under the Genocide 
Convention (1949), which requires states both to prevent genocide and punish perpetrators.  
Despite continuing failures, however, over the past two decades, the duty to punish has begun to 
be fulfilled.  The establishment of the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia 
and Rwanda, the International Criminal Court, and other post-conflict and transitional justice 
processes have given institutional power to a new norm of international criminal accountability, 
which has spread across the globe, rapidly albeit unevenly, in what Kathryn Sikkink has called a 
‘justice cascade’ (Sikkink, 2011).   
Until recently, one could not point to a comparable ‘prevention cascade.’   Virtually 
nothing was done on prevention until the past two decades, due to flaws in the Genocide 
Convention’s definition of genocide, the treaty’s lack of a monitoring mechanism, inadequate 
political will, and the controversial legal status of humanitarian interventions.  Moreover, in 
terms developed by Toni Erskine, prevention is a form of prospective responsibility, and 
measuring the degree to which the state has fulfilled such obligations is difficult (Erskine, 2004, 
pp. 33, 37).  The International Law Commission has commented that ‘Obligations of prevention 
are usually construed as best efforts obligations, requiring States to take all reasonable or 
necessary measures to prevent a given event from occurring, but without warranting that the 
event will not occur’ (Crawford, ed., 2002, p. 140).  Requiring a certain standard of effort 
(‘reasonable and necessary measures’) rather than certain outcomes, prevention is what Melissa 
Labonte calls in her chapter ‘an imperfect duty.’  Finally, as Mark Gibney points out, states, not 
individuals, bear preventive responsibility, which means that responsibility is dispersed across a 
bureaucracy and may be hard to pinpoint. 
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Nonetheless, preventive capacity has progressed in the first decade of the twenty-first 
century, and especially since the 2005 World Summit when the international community 
endorsed the Responsibility to Protect (R2P).  New prevention efforts have begun at the UN, in 
regional and sub-regional organizations, and in many states.  The United States, under President 
Barack Obama, declared atrocity prevention a ‘core national security interest’ in August, 2010, 
and formed its own Atrocities Prevention Board on April 23, 2012.  Regional organizations have 
begun to develop preventive capacities (Office of the Special Adviser, ‘Engaging with Partners’; 
Ban, Implementing 2009).  UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon called for 2012 to be ‘The Year 
of Prevention’ (Office of the Special Adviser, Anniversary, 6 December 2012).  It would seem 
that prevention has reached its tipping point. 
The recent efforts to establish and disseminate preventive policies provide a critical 
opportunity to study the process of norm diffusion.  This chapter offers a legal framework for 
understanding the norm of atrocity prevention, a structuralist framework for analyzing diffusion 
processes, and an empirical comparison of the preventive efforts of the international community 
and the United States.  Concerned with the particular relations that give local expression to 
universal aspirations, the chapter is situated at the juncture ‘between facts and norms’ 
(Habermas, 1998). 
The chapter finds that, although the US and international efforts are analogous, they are 
founded on different assumptions about the content and process of prevention.  The UN efforts, 
grounded in the collective ethos of R2P, envision prevention as a multilateral act, rooted in 
Security Council decisions and Secretariat-level coordination.  By contrast, the US has so far 
largely established its own preventive capacities through a process that has ignored or skirted the 
UN’s R2P apparatus.  The exceptionalist approach undertaken by the US has generated 
international skepticism and some domestic pushback, and if continued may compromise the US 
government’s capacity to fulfill its prevention aims. That would be a missed opportunity, 
because the world needs US leadership to ensure that people are protected from the states that 
fail to prevent mass atrocities. 
 
Legal Framework:  Prevention as Obligation 
Until recently, progress on prevention has been impeded by the weak legal framework in 
which it was ensconced.  Flaws in the Genocide Convention’s definition of the crime have made 
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it notoriously easy for states to avoid taking prospective responsibility (Mennecke, 2009).  Also, 
unlike later treaties, the Convention did not form a treaty body to monitor states’ compliance: as 
a result, although acts that could contribute to genocide were monitored by the Covenants and 
other treaties, genocide as such was not formally monitored by any UN agency. The only attempt 
to incorporate genocide in the six major human rights treaties is in Art. 6 (3) of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which mentions genocide primarily as a limit on the 
death penalty.  The ICCPR’s reticence with respect to genocide has minimized the ability of the 
Human Rights Committee to monitor genocidal activity, and its periodic reporting system is not 
geared toward the ongoing monitoring that early warning requires.  Without monitoring, no early 
warning capacity could be developed. Without early warning, no early diplomacy was possible. 
Without early warning and diplomacy, the world has had little recourse but costly late 
interventions after mass killings have already escalated.  
Since 2000, the international community has rewritten prevention into a stronger legal 
framework, bypassing the definitional traps, reconceiving interventions, and establishing 
monitoring mechanisms.   In addition to genocide, prevention now focuses on war crimes, crimes 
against humanity, and ethnic cleansing. Together these are referred to as ‘mass atrocities’ as a 
matter of policy at the UN (Mennecke, 2009).  New prevention efforts have sought to end the 
controversy over the legality of humanitarian interventions, justifying them via the doctrine of 
R2P.  The R2P requirement that States prevent atrocities (to their own or others’ civilians), react 
when atrocities are committed, and rebuild after atrocities have ended takes prevention out of its 
isolated and ignored condition in the Genocide Convention and resituates it in what the 
Secretary-General has called a ‘continuum of steps’ (Ban, Five-Point Action Plan, 2008).  That 
is, prevention is understood to be part of a broader system designed to prevent human rights 
violations in general, on the theory that, while the causes of genocide and mass atrocities are 
disparate, states that handle domestic disputes well and protect human rights in general ‘are 
unlikely to follow such a destructive path.’(Ban, 2009, paras. 15-16).  Much of the Secretary-
General’s emphasis has been on non-coercive measures under chapters VI and VIII of the UN 
Charter.  Prevention now belongs to the broad effort to create stable states.     
Some commentators assert that R2P is an ethical and political norm rather than a legal 
one (Hehir, 2012, p. 85; Patrick, 2012).  On the contrary, prevention is rooted in the legal 
concept of erga omnes obligations—obligations owed to the international community as a whole.  
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The International Court of Justice initiated this line of thinking in 1970, in its opinion in the 
landmark Barcelona Traction case (ICJ, 1970, paras. 33-34).  It listed examples of erga omnes 
obligations as ‘the outlawing of acts of aggression, and of genocide, as also from the principles 
and rules concerning the basic rights of the human person, including protection from slavery and 
racial discrimination.’ An erga omnes obligation, like a peremptory human rights norm (jus 
cogens), is one that is recognized as universal and undeniable (ICJ, 1970, paras. 33-34).  The 
court said that any state has the right to complain of a breach of an erga omnes obligation, even 
if that state has not itself been injured. At this point, complaint to the ICJ was the sole remedy 
envisioned. The court has since invoked erga omnes obligations in opinions on breaches of the 
Genocide Convention and the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (ICJ, 
Application, 1996, paras. 31-32; Song and Kong, 2011; Mennecke). 
The language of R2P in the World Summit Outcome was the General Assembly’s 
attempt to operationalize the doctrine of erga omnes obligations.  The Outcome document gives 
the cover of law to efforts to prevent and intervene in internationally wrongful acts; indeed, the 
lawfulness of humanitarian interventions under R2P is what distinguishes them from similar 
interventions prior to 2005.  In keeping with the International Law Commission’s ‘Articles on 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts’ (2001), the World Summit Outcome 
ensured that when there is a breach of an erga omnes obligation, a non-injured State can go 
beyond the ICJ’s complaint mechanism to call for collective countermeasures against the 
violating State with the object of preventing further civilian suffering (ILC, Draft Articles on 
Responsibility, 2001).   
That is not to say that R2P has the force of treaty law.  At present, its legal status is 
anomalous—more than a declaration but less than positive law.  It is less than positive law 
because the Summit Outcome document is not a codified treaty with measures of 
implementation, monitoring, and enforcement.  Yet it is not a discretionary entitlement for SC 
members (or a right to intervene if they choose).  The term responsibility specifies a duty, not a 
right.  R2P recognizes that upon a state’s manifest failure, international action of some kind is 
not only lawful but obliged.   
 
 Structuralist Framework:  Diffusion Vectors 
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The spread of a prevention cascade is an issue of norm diffusion.  How and why has the 
norm of prevention—mentioned in the Genocide Convention but then routinely ignored—come 
to the forefront at this time?  How has it spread?  In what forms has it been practiced?  Where the 
US is concerned, to what extent are prevention efforts homegrown or results of the larger 
diffusion of the international norm of R2P?  Can the US efforts help shape the international 
prevention response?   
Diffusion has been studied using a variety of colorful metaphors such as clusters, waves, 
cascades, contagions, dominoes, tipping points, thresholds, magnetic attractions, spirals, and 
boomerang effects—and the metaphor of diffusion itself (Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink, 1999; Elkins 
and Simmons, 2005; Cao, Greenhill, and Prakash, 2006).  Such terms capture the dynamic, 
relational quality between the sending and receiving entities, and describe the mechanism for 
spreading a norm from one jurisdiction to another.  Much recent attention has addressed the 
transfer of norms across different levels of governance (global, regional, and domestic).  
Solingen has shown that multi-level diffusion analyses must account for diffusion’s stimulus, 
medium, obstacles, agents, and outcomes (Solingen, 2012). 
In addition to these factors, many analyses attend to the direction of the diffusion.  For 
example, Plümper and Neumeyer have studied diffusion’s horizontal vector:  the spread of norms 
from state to state.  They find that the spread of policies on the horizontal vector is often due to 
spatial or cultural dependence, that is, the geographical neighborhood effects resulting from a 
common linguistic or colonial history or proximate country ‘peer pressure’ between sending and 
receiving states (Plümper and Neumeyer, 2010).  In addition to spatial dependence, Neumeyer 
and his colleagues Cho and Dreher have suggested that horizontal diffusion can often be 
predicted by finding similar voting patterns by a cluster of states at the General Assembly.  In 
such cases, the process of diffusion is probably learning or emulation (Cho, Dreher, and 
Neumeyer, 2012).  In other cases, Elkins and Simmons suggest, there is a process of adaptation 
by which the norm is altered to take account of national differences (Elkins and Simmons, 2005). 
Others have studied the vertical direction of diffusion, either from the top down or the 
bottom up.   Greenhill describes the ‘socialization effects’ that IGOs can have on the national 
participants in international institutions, demonstrating that membership in IGOs significantly 
improves states’ human rights behavior with respect to personal integrity rights (Greenhill, 2010; 
also cf. Brysk, 1993).  He posits that officials from states with less respect for human rights learn 
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respect through participation in the IGO and internalizing its monitoring, education, and 
adjudication practices.  In other words, such officials are ‘socialized’ by the IGO.   
While this type of socialization captures a top-down process, some scholars describe a 
‘bottom-up’ vector.  For example, Sikkink has described a process by which civil society ‘norm 
entrepreneurs’ (such as activists, NGOs, academics, or business leaders) exerted an impact on 
States and IGOs with respect to the spread of international criminal justice (Sikkink, 2011, pp. 
24, 124; Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998, p. 898; Sugiyama, 2012; Greenhill, 2010; Cao, Greenhill, 
and Prakash, 2006). 
In special cases, some states can themselves socialize the international community.  One 
would expect that at least the world’s most powerful States would exert an influence on the IGOs 
themselves.  For example, there is evidence that the United States’ tiered approach to monitoring 
and combatting human trafficking in its annual Trafficking in Persons Report has diffused both 
to other states and to the UN itself (Trafficking, 2012; Tiefenbrun, 2007).  In such a case, it is 
hard to know whether to describe the diffusion vector as up or down.  The United States is in a 
special position vis a vis the international system because it is a member of the P5 with veto 
power in the Security Council, serves as the home base of the United Nations, and largely funds 
the UN’s activities.  It is thus poised to reject international initiatives it perceives as against its 
interests, and is also in the curious (hegemonic) position of a state that can diffuse a norm down 
to the international community. 
One well developed and influential diffusion theory that proposes a combination of 
vectors is the model developed by Risse, Sikkink, and Ropp in The Power of Human Rights 
(1999).  These authors trace a ‘ boomerang effect’ in which domestic advocacy networks look 
outside the state for aid from international advocacy networks, the latter then raise awareness and 
convince the international community of states to pressure the norm-violating state, which opens 
political space for the domestic advocates to make their voices heard.  The boomerang effect has 
only limited explanatory power in the case at hand.  The theory emphasizes that change comes 
from non-state actors, but the primary entity pushing prevention in the US has been the state 
itself.  Moreover, the cases that this model addresses are those in which a norm-violating state 
changes its behavior as part of a liberalization process, but the United States sees itself as a 
founding member of the international community of liberal states and a net norm exporter (Risse, 
Sikkink, and Ropp, 1999, pp. 3-4).  The American self-image as non-violating and liberal is only 
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partially accurate, and we will see that a limited boomerang effect did occur after the US 
government initiated its prevention efforts. 
As in other areas of international relations, atrocity prevention scholars have developed 
both normative and realist approaches (Kuperman, 2009; Hirsch and Totten, 2011; Strauss, 
2009).  For realists like Kuperman, mass atrocities are too complex, with too many different 
causes and consequences to enable the predictability of any normative model.  The political 
dimension depends on fickle alliances among states.  SC members might not target an ally 
committing genocide with the same countermeasures as those used on an enemy state.  The 
degree to which a norm can be diffused, in this view, depends less on IGO socialization effects 
or other kinds of subtle pressure than on instrumentally exerted power.  This chapter attempts to 
occupy the middle ground between realist and normative accounts—the ground of pragmatic 
idealism—following Jacques Sémelin, editor of the Encyclopedia of Mass Violence.  While 
criticizing the ‘wishful thinking’ of many genocide prevention efforts, Sémelin equally criticizes 
those who argue that ‘because we can never be sure of the outcome, it is futile to intervene,’ and 
declares his assumptions that ‘genocide is preventable’ and that scholarship on mass violence 
can help identify patterns that might lead to constructive policy prescriptions (Sémelin, 2009). 
By paying attention to diffusion’s vector, we can see that norm influence is not a simple 
question of transferring a fixed policy from one environment to another. The norm is 
operationalized in local ways, often resulting in uneven expression across jurisdictions 
(Neumeyer and Perkins, 2005; Gertler, 2001).  Heterogeneity is typical because, in Solingen’s 
terms, national or regional political ‘firewalls’ often become ‘sedimented’ and ‘defy 
determinism, automaticity, or teleology’ in diffusion (Solingen, 2012; also Finnemore and 
Sikkink, 1998, p. 893).  Power dynamics between the sending and receiving entities, along with 
the internal political relations operating inside both entities, will influence whether and how the 
norm is diffused.  State capacity to implement norms varies widely.  The dynamic that sender 
and receiver have with third parties, such as allies, neighbors, or civil society actors, may also 
shape the norm’s expression (Cao, Greenhill, and Prakash, 2006).  Thus, in diffusion studies, the 
norm in question should not be treated as static and independent, but as variable and dependent.  
The institutional expression results from the interaction between the ideal-typical policy and the 
facts on the ground.  Put concisely:  The operational form of a diffused norm is the product of 
contingent relations.   
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The UN model of prevention differs from the state-based model in the US, making the 
norm uneven in its expression (Sikkink, 2011, p. 247).  Can the two institutions partner with each 
other in such a case?  Are the UN efforts having an ‘IGO socialization effect’ on state officials, 
in particular on US officials on its Atrocities Prevention Board?  What efforts has the US made 
to socialize other states and IGOs to its model of prevention, and how successful have its efforts 
been to date?  Finally, to what extent do the UN and US efforts share an understanding of what 
constitutes prevention, and what firewalls might impede the IGO and the state from finding a 
consensus approach? 
 
Prevention at the UN 
We have seen that the UN approach to prevention since 2000 has four unique conceptual 
and institutional features.  First, the crimes to be prevented have been expanded from ‘genocide’ 
to ‘mass atrocities’ so as to move beyond the definitional confines of the Genocide Convention. 
Second, prevention has become integrated into the larger R2P process, which sees the duty to 
prevent as the first in a ‘continuum of steps.’  Third, the R2P orientation enables genocide to be 
the subject of sustained monitoring and early detection by UN bodies, something not previously 
possible because the Genocide Convention did not establish its own monitoring body and the 
other treaty bodies did not see genocide as within their purview. Fourth, R2P replaces the older, 
legally questionable model of humanitarian intervention:  now, countermeasures are considered 
lawful and necessary as long as they originate when a sovereign fails to protect its own citizens, 
breaching its obligation to the international community as a whole, and are undertaken as part of 
a multilateral effort rooted in the Security Council to prevent and stop atrocities. 
This approach, in development since the late 1990s, began to crystallize at the Jan. 26, 
2004, Stockholm International Forum on Preventing Genocide, where the Secretary-General 
called for an Action Plan to Prevent Genocide (Akhavan, 2006; Ban, 2008).  To carry out the 
plan, he appointed Juan E. Mendez as the first Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide, in 
July, 2004. The Special Adviser’s job was to collect existing information on massive rights 
violations of ethnic and racial origin that might lead to genocide; act as a mechanism of early 
warning to the Secretary-General and the Security Council; make recommendations on action to 
prevent or halt genocides in progress; and liaise with other members of the UN system.  He was 
to be a ‘focal point’ in the UN system for gathering, filtering, analyzing, and fast-tracking 
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information related to genocide prevention (Akhavan, 2006).  Supporters of the position have 
praised the Special Adviser’s ability to give mass atrocities the visibility formerly only accorded 
to war crimes (Ban, 2008; Ban, 2009). 
The Special Adviser’s office grew slowly: two years into his appointment, Mendez, who 
was hired part-time, had only two part-time staff and an administrative assistant.  Given limited 
resources, he focused on identifying threatening situations and making recommendations, 
ranging from strengthening peacekeeping, preventing ethnic incitement by interceding with 
officials, and publicly expressing concern (Ban, 2008; Ban, 2009).  The office faced significant 
bureaucratic obstacles to its effectiveness from the beginning, and there was no system at all for 
collecting information from states and NGOs.  Developing an early warning system necessitated 
consultations and verification of facts, far more work than the resources of the office could 
support (Akhavan, 2006).  
Over time, some of these problems were overcome while others continue to weaken the 
Special Adviser.  The Special Adviser has succeeded in developing methodology, identifying 
crisis situations, and finding compatible areas for work with other R2P entities, and is now a full-
time position (UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2009).  By 2007, the Special Adviser 
had begun to go on country visits; send notes to the Secretary-General informing him of high risk 
situations; consult with member states as well as regional IGOs, NGOs, and academics; develop 
a ‘framework of analysis’ to aid in selecting the proper response in a given case; and compile a 
‘package’ of international law beyond the Genocide Convention to guide states (See OSAPG, 
‘Analysis Framework,’ n.d.; Jacob Blaustein Institute, 2011).  These efforts began to bear fruit 
when election violence began to escalate in Kenya in December, 2007:  the Special Adviser’s 
actions were widely credited with helping to tamp down the violence before it escalated, and he 
has since worked in similar ways on a range of issues.   
The Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide (OSAPG) has had its 
share of critics.  Even many prevention supporters have objected to the ways the norm has been 
institutionalized—a significant obstacle if the UN hopes to diffuse its model down to states 
(Hehir, 2010).  Critics have faulted the Special Adviser for being symbolic, redundant, too 
beholden to the Secretary-General, and either not loud enough as a whistleblower, or too loud to 
engage in behind-the scenes diplomacy.  The bifurcation between public advocate and backstage 
manager became controversial when Francis Deng was appointed the second Special Adviser in 
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August, 2007. Rights NGOs thought Deng should be a voice of conscience first, a diplomat 
second; Deng thought the order should be reversed (Hehir, 2010). Aid groups thought the Special 
Adviser’s mandate to raise public awareness had a reverse effect, alienating relevant government 
officials at critical moments and preventing the aid groups from getting in, as Kurt Mills 
discusses in his chapter (Akhavan, 2006).   
Critics, including the Secretary-General himself, criticized the prevention measures for 
focusing too much on developing an early warning system, suggesting that the real problem was 
how to share existing information (Grünfeld and Vermeulen, 2009; Ban, 2009; Ban, 2010; 
Hirsch, 2009).  Critics claimed that the Secretary-General exercised a filtering function over the 
Special Adviser’s information, which compromised the Special Adviser’s independence and 
authority with the Security Council.  This perception was reinforced each time the P5 blocked 
the Special Adviser’s request to address the Security Council directly rather than sending his 
report through the Secretary-General.  The Special Adviser faces a reactive, not preventive, 
culture, and was often therefore seen as meddling or alarmist (Hehir, 2010).  Finally, OSAPG 
does not address what some see as the central issue in genocide prevention:  the absence of 
political will (Hehir, 2010).  All of these obstacles have stood in the way of successful diffusion 
of prevention via OSAPG. 
Despite the obstacles, the office has grown more effective.  The Secretariat institutionally 
expresses the close relationship between prevention and R2P in that, until both retired in 2012, 
Edward C. Luck, the Special Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect since 2008, and Francis 
Deng shared office space and worked together on many issues (Ban, 2009).  Before their 
retirement, Deng and Luck worked together to diffuse the prevention norm to regional and sub-
regional IGOs and states, recognizing that while states often do not want to be singled out in this 
arena, regional bodies can often work effectively, have local expertise, are more deeply invested 
in and effected by the outcome of any preventive measures, and can provide political support for 
intervention, if necessary (Ban, 2011).  As will become clear below, many other individual states 
and regional IGOs have begun to cooperate with the Special Adviser’s mandate (OSAPG, 
‘Engaging,’ n.d.).  The succeeding Special Advisers,  Adama Dieng (appointed as the SA for 
Genocide Prevention on July 17, 2012) and Jennifer Welsh (appointed as the SA for the 
Responsibility to Protect on July 12, 2013), share these commitments. 
 
11 
 
Prevention in the US 
The growing list of the Special Advisers’ partners so far does not include the United 
States.  The UN model of collective action based on Security Council decisions and coordinated 
by OSPAG seems to run up against American exceptionalism, the belief that the US serves as a 
beacon to other states and thus cannot be expected to place itself under the same monitoring 
regimes. Under this view, the US participates in the international human rights system in creating 
and modeling the norms for which the system strives.  Such an attitude precludes the emulation 
of much of the UN’s prevention approach by the US. 
The US has a long history of opting to operate outside of international institutions, in 
particular on human rights issues.  The US refusal to join the International Criminal Court is only 
a recent example of a trend that began in the 1950s (Henkin, 1995; Korey, 2001, p. 44; 
Galchinsky, 2008, pp. 93-94).  This history constitutes a significant ideological firewall 
impeding diffusion from the global to the state level.  So it will not be surprising that the 
prevention norm in the US developed, for the most part, independently of the analogous norm at 
the UN.  Like the UN effort, the American genocide prevention initiative grew out of a sense of 
failure in Rwanda and Bosnia. Madeleine Albright and William Cohen, President Clinton’s 
Secretaries of State and Defense during those crises, worked during President George W. Bush’s 
second term to convene a Genocide Prevention Task Force, under the auspices of the US 
Holocaust Memorial Museum’s Committee on Conscience, to come up with a prevention 
proposal.  The Task Force issued its report, Preventing Genocide: a Blueprint for US 
Policymakers, in 2008, at the start of President Obama’s term (Albright and Cohen, 2008).   
It was good timing. Candidate Obama had promised to pay more attention to genocide 
prevention and, for this purpose, had made Samantha Power, a well-known genocide scholar, 
one of his senior advisors. The Task Force report analyzed America’s readiness to undertake 
genocide prevention and recommended the creation of an interagency prevention mechanism, 
with members drawn from pertinent areas throughout the government. It called for the 
establishment of a National Intelligence Estimate on worldwide risks of genocide and mass 
atrocities—essentially an early warning mechanism.  It recommended strengthening partnerships 
with the UN and the African Union on military deployment options and information-sharing, and 
promoted engagement with at-risk states by preventively working with their leaders, 
strengthening their institutions, and promoting their civil society. 
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The final section of the Blueprint is dedicated to ‘International Action: Norms and 
Institutions.’ The report affirms that with R2P, the norm of prevention has been taking hold 
globally (98). It goes on to characterize R2P as a ‘revolution in conscience’ among regional 
organizations and UN officials, mentioning the Special Advisers and the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights. Nevertheless, it identifies challenges to international action to prevent genocide: 
lack of political will, difficulty of effective response, competing national interests, and the veto 
power of the Permanent Five. While recognizing R2P’s call for ‘effective action’ by the 
international community to prevent and halt atrocities, it nonetheless stops short of recognizing 
that under R2P effective and lawful action is coordinated by the UN.  In fact, a number of 
scholarly critics suggested that Albright-Cohen’s recommendation to form a network of like-
minded governments, IGOs, and NGOs may have been aimed at bypassing the UN (Üngör, 
2011, Theriault, 2009).  If so, the call for international action was another example of US 
exceptionalism at work. 
While genocide scholars noted the report’s mention of R2P, they criticized it as US-
centric.  It identifies the US, they asserted, as a moral preventive force without acknowledging 
US complicity in past atrocities or addressing the US decision not to join the ICC.  How can the 
United States claim it is serious about genocide prevention, they asked, much less be a leader of 
the effort, if it refuses to join a court dedicated to punishing genocide? (Üngör, 2011, Theriault, 
2009).  The report fails, they said, to wrap its policy framework tightly enough within 
international law and R2P, and does a poor job of integrating valuable information that has 
already emerged from international efforts (Hirsch, 2009).  In sum, they accused the Blueprint of 
adhering to the American habit of go-it-alone bravura. 
Has the Obama administration’s outlook been more global than the Blueprint’s?  So far 
the evidence is mixed.  Although the APB only came formally into being in April, 2012, a 
preventive response to atrocity crimes had been in the works in many US agencies since the start 
of the administration’s first term.  In April, 2008, the Department of Homeland Security’s 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement division had established a Human Rights Violators and 
War Crimes Unit to target individuals associated with atrocity crimes who have entered the 
country fraudulently (Forman, 2009).  Despite the US resistance to joining the ICC, President 
Obama referred the situation in Libya to the court. He has supported regional efforts to 
apprehend Joseph Kony, worked to facilitate the transition to independence of South Sudan, and 
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helped create the truth commissions in Cote d’Ivoire, Kyrgyzstan, Libya, and Syria, among other 
things (White House, ‘Fact Sheet,’ 2012).  On the day before the administration formed the APB, 
the President issued an Executive Order establishing new, targeted sanctions for governments 
and corporations that engage in so-called ‘GHRAVITY’ offenses—Grave Human Rights Abuses 
Via Information Technology (Obama, ‘Blocking the Property,’ 22 Apr 2012).  
These programs underscore a remark President Obama made in the speech, ‘Honoring the 
Pledge of “Never Again”,’ in which he announced the APB’s establishment:  atrocities 
prevention, he said, ‘is not an afterthought.  This is not a sideline in our foreign policy’ (Obama, 
‘Honoring the Pledge’, 23 Apr 2012).  Rather, as he had put it in Presidential Study Directive 10, 
in August, 2011:   
Preventing mass atrocities and genocide is a core national security interest and a 
core moral responsibility of the United States (Obama, 2011). 
With high-level representatives from eleven government departments and agencies, the APB is 
tasked with pooling information on mass atrocities generated from throughout the government, 
turning the information into actionable recommendations, and developing prevention training 
materials specialized to each department’s or agency’s needs.  In this, it sounds very much like a 
national version of the OSAPG.   The APB is helping each of its constituents develop its 
prevention capacity:  State is developing preventive diplomatic ‘surges’ during crisis situations. 
USAID now offers awards for technological innovation in early warning systems, and also 
development aid.  Treasury is developing tools to block the flow of money to abusive regimes.  
Defense is developing doctrine, planning, training, and exercises for Mass Atrocity Response 
Operations.  In the area of intelligence, the APB is monitoring the National Intelligence 
Council’s preparation of the first-ever National Intelligence Estimate on the global risk of mass 
atrocities and genocide (White House, ‘Fact Sheet,’ 2012).  It is fair to say that Obama is the first 
President to place atrocities prevention on the US government’s front burner.  
However, as the Blueprint presaged, the APB’s goals were somewhat thinner with regard 
to America’s international partners. To be sure, an extensive White House fact sheet, published 
the day the APB was founded, asserted that ‘Our diplomats will encourage more robust 
multilateral efforts to prevent and respond to atrocities.’  It described plans to aid a UN 
Peacekeeper training program for preventing sexual and gender-based violence, which was one 
of the Special Advisers’ initiatives.  However, its global plans were generally short on detail, and 
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did not designate which of its partners it would work with or how.  It did not mention either the 
UN’s Special Advisers or the R2P initiative when it described its aim to ‘strengthen UN system 
capacity.’  Similarly, no details were offered about how the APB ‘will also work with our 
partners to build the capacity of regionally-based organizations to prevent and respond to 
atrocities.’  Perhaps the most telling lacuna was in the section on ‘Denying Impunity Abroad,’ 
which went to great lengths not to mention the ICC.  The US would support ‘mechanisms…that 
seek to hold accountable perpetrators of atrocities when doing so advances US interests and 
values…’ (White House, ‘Fact Sheet,’ 2012).  The caveat (‘when doing so…’) recalled the 
language that both the Bush and Obama administrations used in rejecting calls to join the ICC—
that the court does not advance US interests because it theoretically puts US personnel at risk of 
prosecution. 
The absence of a stronger commitment to the UN prevention system was not due to US 
officials’ lack of knowledge about international efforts.  In the preparation for the APB, senior 
US officials attended a number of symposia on international prevention efforts.  At an October, 
2010 conference sponsored by the Stanley Foundation on ‘Atrocity Prevention and US National 
Security:  Implementing the Responsibility to Protect,’ they interacted with Special Advisers 
Deng and Luck, and the discussion centered on how to ‘enhance US government communication 
and coordination with the UN System, and increase support for UN institutional developments 
such as the anticipated “joint office” on genocide prevention and R2P’ (Thaler, 2010; Woocher 
and Stares, 2010).  One of the participants was Lawrence Woocher, who also served on the 
Genocide Prevention Task Force that had drafted the Blueprint.  The APB’s exceptionalist path 
to date is an informed policy choice.   
The fear that the APB ‘s work would be too unilateral could be heard underneath the 
diplomatic language the Special Advisers adopted in their joint statement the day after the APB 
was formed (OSAPG, ‘Launch,’ 2012).  While welcoming the US initiative, the Advisers called 
on UN Member States to ‘share their best practices and lessons learned, so that the collective 
effort can be more than the sum of its parts.’ The balance of the statement focused, not on the 
American effort, but on ‘the growing series of partnerships established by Member States under 
a Responsibility to Protect framework’ (OSAPG, ‘Launch,’ 2012).  While praising the APB 
because ‘innovative and sustained measures at the national level are essential for the full 
operationalization of the Responsibility to Protect,’ the Advisers emphasized the global, regional, 
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and above all collective nature of the prevention cascade, and their own role as UN liaisons and 
coordinators of the broader R2P effort.  This exchange is evidence of a struggle over ownership 
of the norm of atrocity prevention and the heterogeneous forms by which it might be expressed. 
It was not long after the APB’s establishment that some members of the public were 
beginning to wonder when the APB would act, especially once the Syrian civil war heated up 
during the summer of 2012 (Spetalnick, 2012; Patrick, 2012; Thaler, 2012).  The international 
community’s unwillingness to prevent the Syrian government from killing thousands of its own 
civilians raised the question of whether R2P had lost ground or was even practicable (Thaler, 
2012).  The rivalries within the P5 represented a firewall against the application of R2P in the 
Syrian case and threatened the SC’s consistent adoption of preventive measures.  With the SC 
paralyzed, the world looked to the US for leadership. 
Reacting to international inaction on Syria, then-Secretary of State Hilary Clinton spoke 
to a symposium on genocide prevention held at the US Holocaust Memorial Museum in 
cooperation with CNN and the Council on Foreign Relations, on July 24, 2012 (Clinton, 2012).  
Clinton reiterated the steps the administration was taking on ‘prevention and partnership.’  She 
reiterated the APB’s ‘whole of government response’ on prevention.  With respect to expanding 
partnerships, she mentioned the intention to work with the AU and ECOWAS.  She also 
mentioned working to strengthen the ‘UN’s core peace and security tools,’ but once again she 
made no reference to R2P or the Special Advisers.  Finally, she acknowledged that ‘a small 
group of nations’ obstruction can derail our efforts…in the Security Council.’  Clinton’s address 
was well received, but it did not stop opinion bloggers like John Bradshaw of Freedom House 
from wondering whether it was possible to ‘convert rhetoric to reality on atrocity prevention’ 
(Bradshaw, 2012). 
Such questions continued to the point that, on the anniversary of the APB’s 
establishment, the White House felt the need to publish a second fact sheet detailing the 
administration’s ‘comprehensive efforts’ to prevent mass atrocities during the board’s first year 
(White House, ‘Fact Sheet,’ 2013).  This may have been an attempt to pre-empt a report by 
Madeleine K. Albright and Richard S. Williamson, who had in the interim formed a Working 
Group on the Responsibility to Protect, comprised of members of the United States Institute of 
Peace, the Holocaust Museum, and the Brookings Institution.  Their report, released in May, 
2013, gauged US and international efforts on a range of R2P case studies, from the full use of 
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R2P (Libya) to failure to use R2P effectively (Syria) (Albright and Williamson, 2013).  The 
Working Group commented that the APB ‘might well serve as an appropriate model for others’ 
(23), but the report’s recommendations indicate that the US was not doing enough to support 
international efforts.  Recognizing that ‘No country acting alone has the resources, information, 
or authority to fulfill more than a modest portion of what R2P requires’ (23), it agreed with the 
Special Advisers that the UN should be the central organization in preventive efforts and argued 
that ‘the more capable the United Nations is, the less often US troops and taxpayer dollars will 
be summoned to cope with emergencies’ (24).  Accordingly, the report urged the US to 
strengthen the preventive capacity of the UN by increasing funding for OSAPG, as well as by 
adopting a ‘more positive engagement’ with the ICC by funding investigations and prosecutions 
arising from SC referrals to the court.  Here the ‘boomerang effect’—by which domestic 
advocates adopt the language of international actors to persuade their own government—did 
come into play.   
The APB proclaims the US government’s intention to socialize other states and the UN 
system itself to its own expression of the prevention norm.  Yet it has met resistance when 
attempting to export American-style prevention because it has not, at the same time, accepted 
both the limits that R2P places on US action in the absence of SC approval, and the authority of 
the ICC.  Perhaps now that Samantha Power has become US ambassador to the UN, the US will 
embrace multilateralism as essential to the success of the prevention cascade.  By doing so, 
American leaders will legitimate the emerging legal norm that a state’s breach of an erga omnes 
obligation is an internationally wrongful act to which the world is obliged to respond.  Until such 
time as there is an R2P treaty or the customary behavior of states becomes more consistent, SC 
members will be able to dodge their secondary responsibility.  But Americans’ commitment to 
prevention as a collective legal obligation will demonstrate to the world that having the capacity 
to dodge is different from having the right to dodge.  When a state fails to prevent atrocities to its 
citizens, it not only devastates them but threatens the fundamental principles on which the world 
order rests.  Both for the citizens’ sake and the defense of that order, the world must react. 
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